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Focusing on lucid dreaming, this paper examined relationships between dissociated
experiences related to rapid eye movement (REM) sleep (lucid dreaming, nightmares,
and sleep paralysis), reality testing, and paranormal experiences/beliefs. The study
comprised a UK-based online sample of 455 respondents (110 males, 345 females,
Mean age = 34.46 years, SD = 15.70), who had all previously experienced
lucid dreaming. Respondents completed established self-report measures assessing
control within lucid dreaming, experience and frequency of nightmares, incidence
of sleep paralysis, proneness to reality testing deficits (Inventory of Personality
Organization subscale, IPO-RT), subjective experience of receptive psi and life after
death (paranormal experience), and paranormal belief. Analysis comprised tests of
correlational and predictive relationships between sleep-related outcomes, IPO-RT
scores, and paranormal measures. Significant positive correlations between sleep and
paranormal measures were weak. Paranormal measures related differentially to sleep
indices. Paranormal experience correlated with lucid dreaming, nightmares, and sleep
paralysis, whereas paranormal belief related only to nightmares and sleep paralysis.
IPO-RT correlated positively with all paranormal and sleep-related measures. Within the
IPO-RT, the Auditory and Visual Hallucinations sub-factor demonstrated the strongest
positive associations with sleep measures. Structural equation modeling indicated
that Auditory and Visual Hallucinations significantly positively predicted dissociated
experiences related to REM sleep, while paranormal experience did not. However,
paranormal experience was a significant predictor when analysis controlled for Auditory
and Visual Hallucinations. The moderate positive association between these variables
explained this effect. Findings indicated that self-generated, productive cognitive-
processes (as encompassed by Auditory and Visual Hallucinations) played a significant
role in conscious control and awareness of lucid dreaming, and related dissociative sleep
states (sleep paralysis and nightmares).
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INTRODUCTION
Lucid Dreaming Background
Lucid dreaming is a dissociated state, which combines aspects of
waking and dreaming (Schredl and Erlacher, 2004; Voss et al.,
2009; LaBerge et al., 2018). Specifically, it denotes conscious
awareness of dreaming during ongoing sleep (Baird et al., 2019).
A central characteristic is that experiencers are typically able
to signal their lucid state during dream periods using pre-
agreed eye-movement signals (LaBerge, 1980; LaBerge et al.,
2018). Concomitantly, lucid dreaming possesses consciousness-
related features such as access to waking memories, increased
insight and control, positive affect, body dissociation, and
logical thought (LaBerge et al., 1981; Voss et al., 2009, 2018).
Other criteria used to distinguish lucid dreams are memory
of the waking state, sentience of freedom of decision, and
full intellectual abilities (Tholey and Utecht, 1987; Lee, 2017).
However, few lucid dreams include all of these features
(Zink and Pietrowsky, 2013).
The concept of lucid dreaming pre-dates modern science as
evinced by the work of ancient scholars (Baird et al., 2019). The
modern conceptualization of lucid dreaming arose from Frederik
van Eeden’s examination of his personal dream experiences. van
Eeden (1913) defined lucid dreams as a state in which “. . .the
reintegration of the psychic functions is so complete that the
sleeper remembers day-life and his own condition, reaches a state
of perfect awareness, and is able to direct his attention, and to
attempt different acts of free volition” (pp. 149–150).
The development of physiological measurement and
enhanced understanding of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep
enabled researchers to produce empirical evidence that supported
the existence of lucid dreaming and facilitated the development
of objective measurement techniques. For instance, the ability to
record pre-agreed eye movement sequences within lucid dreams
became an established procedure (LaBerge et al., 1981, 2018).
Understanding of lucid dreaming has developed over recent
years. Illustratively, Stumbrys et al. (2014) conducted a large-scale
survey (N = 684) that identified important characteristics of lucid
dreams. They found that lucid dreamers usually have their first
experiences during adolescence, and these occur spontaneously.
They noted also that the average lucid dream duration is about
14 min. In terms of phenomenology, lucid dreamers are typically
active within their dreams and direct various actions (e.g., flying).
Although, they are not always able to achieve their goals due to
awakening, obstacles within the dream environment, or failing to
recall intention (Stumbrys et al., 2014).
Incidence of lucid dreaming varies across studies as a function
of methodology (researcher questions, classification criteria, type
of data collection used, etc.) and sample type (see Saunders
et al., 2016). A meta-analysis undertaken by Saunders et al.
(2016) provides the best approximation of prevalence (number of
individuals experiencing at least one lucid dream) and frequency
(those reporting one or more lucid dreams per month). This
estimated that 55% of adults have had at least one lucid dream
in their lives, with 23% of adults experiencing lucid dreaming
regularly (once per month or more).
Individual Differences Related to Lucid
Dreaming
Noting individual differences in prevalence and frequency,
much research has focused on identifying the psychological
variables that facilitate lucid dreaming. Notably, work examining
the role of personality has found that the Big Five personality
factors (openness to experience, conscientiousness, neuroticism,
extraversion, and agreeableness) explain a small but substantial
portion of variation (Hess et al., 2017). Specifically, Hess et al.
(2017) found that openness to experience positively predicted
lucid dreaming frequency, whereas agreeableness correlated
negatively. Furthermore, controlling for nightmare frequency
eliminated the relationship between neuroticism and lucid
dreaming frequency. The openness findings concurred with
Schredl and Erlacher (2004), who reported small significant
relationships between lucid dreaming frequency, openness
to experience, associated dimensions (thin boundaries,
absorption, imagination), and openness facets of fantasy,
aesthetics and feelings.
In addition to the Big Five personality factors, lucid
dreaming correlates with specific personality characteristics
(Blagrove and Tucker, 1994; Blagrove and Hartnell, 2000). For
instance, frequent lucid dreamers (vs. non-lucid dreamers)
score significantly higher on internal locus of control, need
for cognition and creativity (Blagrove and Hartnell, 2000).
Zink and Pietrowsky (2013) propose that these characteristics
index cognitive complexity and flexibility. They also suggest
a preference for self-focused attention, cognitive activity,
and strong imaginative pursuits. Overall, these conclusions
are consistent with studies that report self-reflectiveness
and active control are integral features of lucid dreaming
(Blagrove and Hartnell, 2000).
Noting this, Zink and Pietrowsky (2013) postulated that
creativity plays a principal role in lucid dreaming. Indeed,
Stumbrys and Daniels (2010) found that lucid dreaming
contributed to problem solving in creative tasks. Alongside
creativity, lucid dreaming correlates with related variables.
Explicitly, fantasy proneness and absorption (Koffel and Watson,
2009). These constructs also relate to other sleep experiences
(i.e., retrospective dream recall and dream salience; bizarreness,
vividness, colorfulness, and impact of dreaming) (Koffel and
Watson, 2009). Overall, related literature suggests that the
correlated constructs of creativity, fantasy proneness and
absorption represent a cognitive style based on intensive and
absorptive imaginative involvement (Levin and Young, 2002).
Reality Testing and Lucid Dreaming
Within the psychological literature, there exist different
definitions of reality testing. The researchers used the
conceptualization employed by the reality testing (IPO-RT)
subscale of the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO)
(Lenzenweger et al., 2001). The IPO is a self-report measure
that classifies personality pathology within clinical and non-
clinical samples (Smits et al., 2009; Lenzenweger et al., 2012;
Preti et al., 2015). The selection of the IPO-RT derived from
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the observation that the subscale indexes internally generated
creative, imaginative and vivid mental sensations/imagery.
Explicitly, the IPO-RT delineates reality testing as “the capacity
to differentiate self from non-self, intrapsychic from external
stimuli, and to maintain empathy with ordinary social criteria
of reality” (Kernberg, 1996, p. 120). Accordingly, the IPO-RT
focuses on information processing and provides an assessment
of evaluative mechanisms (Langdon and Coltheart, 2000). Thus,
high scores on the IPO-RT are indicative of a self-oriented,
subjective information processing style, which indexes individual
reliance on internally generated data, specifically intensive,
absorptive imaginative involvement.
Noting the main features of lucid dreaming, and the fact that
reality testing shares important attributes with lucid dreaming
(creativity, inner focus, fantasy proneness, etc.) this paper
examined the degree to which reality testing predicted lucid
dreaming. Congruent with this perspective, researchers use the
IPO-RT as an indirect, proxy measure of intuitive thinking style
(Dagnall et al., 2017). This approach derives from the work of
Epstein (1990, 1994), who developed cognitive-experiential self-
theory, which differentiates experiential (fast, automatic, holistic,
and characterized by proneness to generalization/association)
and rational (slow, intentional, effortful, and logical) processing.
In this context, high scores represent a preference for subjective,
internally generated information and index greater tendency to
reality testing deficits.
It is important to note that the IPO-RT samples a broad
spectrum of cognitive-perceptual phenomena. Recognizing this,
Irwin (2004) contended that the single factor solution depicted in
the original paper represented an oversimplification of domain
content. This applied to sleep research, implies that particular
aspects of reality testing may be more predictive of lucid
dreaming. Recognizing this, the present paper treated the IPO-RT
as a multidimensional measure. The factorial structure selected
derived from Dagnall et al. (2017), who identified four factors:
hallucinations (auditory and visual), delusional thinking (beliefs
contrary to reality), social deficits (difficulties reading social
cues), and sensory/perceptual confusion (inability to understand
feelings and sensations). These factors accounted for 55% of
response variance and were conceptually congruent with the
construct of reality testing within the IPO-RT (Bell et al., 1985;
Caligor and Clarkin, 2010).
Subsequent psychometric evaluation of the IPO-RT by
Dagnall et al. (2018) confirmed the presence of a bifactor
structure consisting of a general dimension encompassing the
four distinct, but inter-correlated sub-factors. Consideration of
the role that sub-factors of reality testing play in lucid dreaming
provides a more precise, fine-grained understanding of the
cognitive-perceptual conditions involved in lucid dreams.
Lucid Dreaming and Paranormal
Experiences/Beliefs
In addition to the IPO-RT, the present study included paranormal
measures (i.e., belief and experience). Previous work informed
this decision. Firstly, Glicksohn (1990) found that belief in
the paranormal correlated positively with subjective paranormal
experiences, which in turn were associated with incidence of at
least one altered state of consciousness and level of absorption.
Based on this finding, Glicksohn (1990) concluded that altered
states of consciousness often reflect psychological elements of the
relationship between paranormal belief and experience. Pertinent
to the present paper, altered states of consciousness indexed
phenomena related to the sleep–wakefulness continuum: lucid
dreams, transitions between sleep and wakefulness (hypnagogic
and hypnopompic states), and out-of-the-body experience
(i.e., the experience of separation from the physical body).
Moreover, paranormal experience correlated with incidence
of lucid dreaming.
Secondly, although the direct relationship between
paranormal belief and lucid dreaming is weak (see Glicksohn,
1990; Denis and Poerio, 2017), studies generally observe
significant positive relationships between paranormal belief
and major constructs associated with lucid dreaming. Notably,
openness to experience (Smith et al., 2009), creativity (Irwin,
1993; Thalbourne and Delin, 1994; Thalbourne, 2005), and
boundary thinness as measured by transliminality (Dagnall et al.,
2010c). Transliminality denotes hypersensitivity to psychological
material (Thalbourne and Maltby, 2008). Particularly, it is “a
hypothesized tendency for psychological material to cross (trans)
thresholds (limines) into or out of consciousness” (Thalbourne
and Houran, 2000, p. 853).
Finally, belief in the paranormal correlates positively
(moderately) with proneness to reality testing deficits
(Drinkwater et al., 2012; Dagnall et al., 2014). Cumulatively,
these findings suggest relationships between lucid dreaming,
reality testing deficits and experience of the paranormal.
Other Dissociated Experiences Related
to Rapid Eye Movement Sleep (Sleep
Paralysis and Dreaming) and Paranormal
Experiences/Beliefs
With relevance to the present study, it is worth noting that
Glicksohn (1990) found that only paranormal experience
predicted lucid dreaming. Cognizant of this, the authors
focused on commonly encountered ‘productive’ psychic
experiences (see Glicksohn, 1990; Dagnall N.A. et al., 2016).
Specifically, receptive forms of psi (telepathy, precognition,
premonition, and remote viewing) and communication with
spirits (contacting the deceased, psychic ability, mediumship,
and spiritualism). Thematically, these phenomena comprise the
mental transmission and reception of information via unknown
powers or forces, and are concomitant with an open and intuitive
approach to experiences (Schmeidler, 1985).
Alongside lucid dreaming, the authors included other
dissociated experiences related to REM sleep (i.e., sleep paralysis
and dreaming). Sleep paralysis was justified because it correlates
positively with lucid dreaming (Denis and Poerio, 2017), and
experiencers frequently report concomitant unusual/anomalous
perceptions and sensations (Denis et al., 2018). Sleep paralysis
combines elements of wakefulness and REM sleep, characterized
by the inability to perform voluntary movements during sleep
onset or awakening (i.e., the sleeper is “immobilized” yet
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perceptually awake) (see American Academy of Sleep Medicine,
2014; Jalal, 2018).
A key feature of sleep paralysis relevant to the current
paper was accompanying hallucinations (strong visual imagery)
(Spanos et al., 1995). These often take the form of uncanny
“ghost-like” experiences and evoke extreme fear reactions (Jalal,
2018). Cheyne places these into three categories: intruder
(sense of evil presence and multi-sensory hallucinations of
intruder), incubus (feeling of pressure on the chest, suffocation,
and physical pain), and vestibular-motor (feature illusory-
movement and out-of-body experiences) (Cheyne et al., 1999b;
Cheyne, 2003). Intruder and incubus hallucinations typically co-
occur and are accompanied by fear, whereas vestibular-motor
hallucinations are more positive (Cheyne, 2003).
As with lucid dreaming, studies report that personality
factors influence occurrence of sleep paralysis. Particularly,
thinner personality boundaries correlate with pleasant sleep
paralysis, and individuals with higher absorption demonstrate
greater propensity to sleep paralysis with hallucinations
(Lišková et al., 2016).
Moreover, Denis and Poerio (2017) found that sleep paralysis
and lucid dreaming were associated with belief in the paranormal.
Denis and Poerio (2017) suggest openness to experience
explains this connection. In addition, imaginal capacity plays
an important role in both lucid dreaming and sleep paralysis.
Relatedly, the strongest predictor of sleep paralysis episodes
was nightmares (Spanos et al., 1995; Lišková et al., 2016).
Nightmares are extremely frightening dreams from which the
person is directly awakened (Spoormaker et al., 2006). Although,
the relationship between nightmares and lucid dreaming is
complex and difficult to establish, nightmare prevalence and
distress is also associated with higher levels of fantasy proneness,
and psychological absorption. Noting this, the present study
considered nightmares together with lucid dreaming and sleep
paralysis for completeness.
The Present Study
The linkage between other dissociated experiences related
to REM sleep and paranormal experiences/beliefs suggests
that factors share common features, which merits further
investigation. Certainly, previous studies such as Denis and
Poerio (2017) have reported weak associations between
paranormal belief, dissociative experiences, lucid dreaming, sleep
paralysis, daydreaming, and imagery. Hence, the present study
extended understanding of the relationship between cognitive-
perceptual personality factors by examining the extent to which
reality testing and paranormal belief/experience predicted lucid
dreaming and sleep-related phenomena (i.e., sleep paralysis
and dreaming). The inclusion of reality testing derived from
the constructs focus on intra-psychic activity and overlap with
factors linked to lucid dreaming (i.e., creativity, imagination,
fantasy proneness, and absorption). These elements link with
consciousness and belief/experience of the paranormal.
Accordingly, the authors hypothesized that reality testing
would correlate with belief in and experience of the paranormal,
and predict lucid dreaming, sleep paralysis and nightmares.
Given that the present study included only respondents who
experienced lucid dreaming and focused on control of lucid
dreaming, the authors tentatively anticipated correlations
between sleep-related factors. This postulation resulted
from the view that experiencers of lucid dreaming possess
a greater awareness of sleep-related phenomena, especially
when experiences reference perception of visual imagery and
imagined sensations.
Consistent with previous work and the supposition that
‘experience’ more directly indexes acceptance of the existence
of paranormal forces than belief, the researchers posited
that only paranormal experience (not belief) would predict
lucid dreaming. This notion is congruent with attributional
models, which regard the labeling of anomalous experiences
as ‘paranormal’ as the final process stage (see Irwin et al.,
2013). Finally, the inclusion of a range of sleep-related measures
enabled the researchers to determine whether reality testing
and paranormal measures were similarly predictive of lucid
dreaming, sleep paralysis, and nightmares.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Procedure
Prior to participation, potential respondents received
background information. This stated the nature of the study and
outlined ethics. Only respondents providing informed consent
received the materials booklet. Instructions asked respondents
to carefully read, answer all questions, and take their time.
Participants worked through the measures at their own pace
and there was no maximum time limit. To prevent order effects
questionnaire position rotated.
Within the present study, data collection occurred at one point
in time. Such cross-sectional designs are frequently criticized
because they can result in common method variance (Spector,
2019). To prevent common method variance, the researchers
employed procedural remedies (Krishnaveni and Deepa, 2013).
Firstly, the study brief and scale instructions emphasized
that each measure assessed a different construct. This created
psychological distance between the scales. Separation strategies,
such as this have previously successfully reduced common
method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Secondly, the study brief
provided information intended to reduce the potential for social
desirability effects and evaluation apprehension by stating that
there were no correct answers, and advising respondents that they
should answer questions honestly.
Participants
The study sample comprised 455 respondents, (Mean age,
M) = 34.46 years, SD = 15.70, range 18–77. There were
110 males (24%), M = 25.31 years, SD = 9.56, range 19–77;
and 345 females (76%), M = 28.00 years, SD = 11.76, range
18–75. For all variables, skewness and kurtosis values were
within the recommended range of −2.0 to +2.0 (Byrne, 2010).
Participant recruitment was via emails to university staff/students
and local stakeholders (businesses, leisure and vocational/sports
classes). If potential participants had not experienced lucid
dreams or were younger than 18 years of age participation
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discontinued. Other studies have also focused on respondents
who have experienced sleep-related phenomena (see Lišková
et al., 2016; study of sleep paralysis). These factors were the only
exclusion criteria.
Measures
Dissociated Experiences Related to Rapid Eye
Movement Sleep
Lucid dreaming
Four items indexed subjective reporting of lucid dreaming
(frequency and control). In order to confirm that respondents
understood what lucid dreams were the first item acted as a
screening check. This included a brief definition preceded by a
rating scale, “During lucid dreaming, one is—while dreaming—
aware of the fact that one is dreaming. It is possible to
deliberately wake up or to control the dream action or to
observe passively the course of the dream with this awareness”
(Snyder and Gackenbach, 1988).
Frequency was assessed using an eight-point rating scale
(0 = never, 1 = less than once a year, 2 = about once a year,
3 = about two to four times a year, 4 = about once a month,
5 = about two to three times a month, 6 = about once a week,
7 = several times a week) (Schredl and Erlacher, 2004; Stumbrys
and Erlacher, 2017). This item ensured that respondents had
experienced lucid dreams. Respondents reporting lucid dreams
rated the extent (in percentages) they were able to maintain
conscious awareness for a sufficiently long period of time;
completely control their dream body (movements and actions);
and design their dream surroundings (to make landscape
or environment and occurring dream characters to appear,
disappear, or change) (Stumbrys and Erlacher, 2017). In this
study, internal consistency was good for this scale, α = 0.81.
Nightmares
Two items assessed the degree to which respondents experienced
and recalled nightmares (Schredl et al., 2016). A brief definition
of nightmares appeared prior to scale completion, “A nightmare
is a vivid dream that is frightening and disturbing, the events
of which you can remember clearly and in detail when
you wake up.”
The first item asked, “How often do you experience
nightmares?” Respondents answered using an eight-point Likert
scale (0 = never, 1 = less than once a year, 2 = about once
a year, 3 = about two to four times a year, 4 = about once
a month, 5 = about two to three times a month, 6 = about
once a week, 7 = several times a week). The second item
asked, “How distressing are your nightmares?” was measured
using a five-point scale (0 = not at all distressing, 1 = not that
distressing, 2 = somewhat distressing, 3 = quite distressing, and
4 = very distressing). The third item assessed recall, “How often
do you wake up and recall a dream” (Schredl, 2004). Participants
responded via a seven-point Likert scale (1 = never, 2 = less
than once a month, 3 = about once a month, 4 = twice or three
times a month, 5 = about once a week, 6 = several times a week,
7 = almost every morning). Alpha reliability for this measure was
satisfactory, α = 0.68.
Movement
A final single item measured respondent experience of sleep
paralysis, “Sometimes when falling asleep or when waking from
sleep, people may experience a brief period of inability to move,
even though they are fully conscious and awake. How often do
you recall this experience?” (Cheyne et al., 1999a). Participants
responded via a four-point Likert scale (1 = never, 2 = once,
3 = two to five times, and 4 = more than five times).
The Reality Testing Subscale of the Inventory of
Personality Organization (IPO-RT)
The IPO-RT (Lenzenweger et al., 2001) assesses the ability
to differentiate self from non-self, intrapsychic from external
stimuli, and to maintain empathy with ordinary social criteria
of reality (Kernberg, 1996). This perspective derives from
an information-processing approach to belief generation (see
Langdon and Coltheart, 2000). Consequently, researchers use the
IPO-RT to assess proneness to reality testing deficits (Irwin, 2004;
Dagnall et al., 2017). Particularly, as an index of the tendency
to engage in subjective-intuitive thinking (Denovan et al., 2017).
The IPO-RT comprises 20-items that appear as statements (e.g.,
“I believe that things will happen simply by thinking about
them”). Respondents specify their level of agreement on a five-
point Likert scale. Possible responses range from 1 = never true
to 5 = always true. Summation of item totals produces scores
between 20 and 100. Higher scores indicate propensity to reality
testing deficits. Previous research has established that the IPO-RT
is psychometrically robust. Explicitly, good internal consistency,
test–retest reliability, and construct validity (Lenzenweger et al.,
2001). In this study, good internal consistency existed, α = 0.92.
Paranormal Measures
Manchester Metropolitan University New (MMU-N)
This study used the MMU-N (Dagnall et al., 2010a,b) to assess
belief in the paranormal in preference to the Revised Paranormal
Belief (Tobacyk and Milford, 1983) and Australian Sheep-
Goat (Thalbourne and Delin, 1993) scales because the MMU-N
measures a broader range of beliefs, and samples these in greater
depth. The MMU-N provides both overall and dimensional, sub
factor scores (i.e., hauntings, superstitions, religious belief, alien
visitation, extrasensory perception, psychokinesis, astrology,
and witchcraft) (Dagnall et al., 2010a,b). These subscales are
conceptually coherent, possess good face validity and are
composed of items clearly related to the assigned factor label.
The MMU-N comprises 50-items presented as statements (e.g.,
‘there is a devil’ and ‘poltergeists exist’) to which participants
respond using a seven-point Likert scale (ranging from 1, strongly
disagree, to 7, strongly agree). Both subscales and the overall
measure possess good to excellent external reliability (Dagnall
et al., 2010a). The measure has featured in published studies,
where it has demonstrated good concurrent validity. In the
current study, this scale evidenced good reliability, α = 0.96.
Paranormal Experience
A series of items asked respondents whether they had
genuinely experienced paranormal/psychic phenomena
(i.e., communication with the dead, psychic, mediumship,
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spiritualism, telepathy, precognition, premonition, and remote
viewing). These items represented core subjective experiences
related to receptive psi and life after death (see Drinkwater et al.,
2013, 2017a). To ensure that respondents understood what each
phenomenon was, a definition appeared within each category.
For example, ‘Mediums receive and relay information from
deceased people to the living. In the context of this definition,
have you ever personally experienced mediumship? ‘Summation
of category scores produced an overall experience total. Scores
ranged from 0 to 8, with higher scores indicating greater
experience of paranormal/psychic phenomena. This method of
measuring experienced paranormal/psychic phenomena is well-
established (Dagnall et al., 2019). Satisfactory alpha reliability
existed for this measure, α = 0.74.
For analysis, the researchers used mean total score for each
variable (see Table 1).
Ethics Statement
As preparation for a grant bid (October 2018), the researchers
gained ethical endorsement for a series of studies examining
psychological and neuropsychological factors associated with
self-professed psychic ability/mediumship. Following formal
submission, the Director of the Research Institute for Health and
Social Care and the Manchester Metropolitan University Faculty
of Health, Psychology and Social Care Ethics Committee granted
ethical approval.
Data Analysis
Data screening occurred prior to computation of descriptive
statistics (means, SDs, and correlations) and model testing. Model
testing via AMOS26 (IBM SPSS) comprised structural equation
modeling, which is a sophisticated analytic technique that tests
hypotheses by computing the weight of standardized regression
paths between variables of interest (depicted as latent variables).
Structural equation modeling incorporates measurement error
in its model estimation, and utilizes fit indices to evaluate
the extent to which observed data corresponds with proposed,
conceptual models.
Preceding model testing, confirmatory factor analysis
examined the adequacy of each study instrument and a
measurement model scrutinized interactions between latent
variables and accompanying outcomes. A structural model
subsequently assessed hypothesis-driven relationships among
latent variables (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). Specifically, the
degree to which reality testing and paranormal belief and/or
experience predicted sleep-related outcomes (lucid dreaming,
sleep paralysis, and nightmares).
A range of indices determined model fit, specifically
absolute fit indices (chi-square statistic, root-mean-square error
of approximation, RMSEA; standardized root-mean-square
residual, SRMR), and relative fit indices (comparative fit index,
CFI; incremental fit index, IFI). Chi-square considers the extent
to which a model reproduces data, with non-significant p-values
indicative of good fit. However, chi-square frequently rejects
models informed by large samples due to its sensitivity to
sample size. Consequently, other indices require inspection
(Kline, 2010).
Root-mean-square error of approximation assesses the
distance between the reproduced covariance matrix and the
sample-based covariance matrix, and includes a 90% confidence
interval (CI) to judge precision of fit. SRMR indexes the
average of standardized residuals between hypothesized and
actual covariance matrices (Cangur and Ercan, 2015). RMSEA
and SRMR statistics of 0.08–1.0, 0.06–0.08 and ≤0.05 indicate
marginal, satisfactory and good fit (Browne and Cudeck, 1993).
Relative fit indices compare the performance of a tested
model to a null model (also called an ‘independence’ model)
(Ching et al., 2014). Values above 0.90 represent good fit
(Hu and Bentler, 1999).
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics and correlations appear in Table 1
alongside univariate kurtosis and skewness data. All values fell
within the recommended range of −2 to +2 (Byrne, 2010).
Given a large number of correlations existed, for comparison
purposes adjustment to the significance level occurred using
a sequential method suggested by Benjamini and Hochberg
(1995); demonstrated by Williams et al. (1999). In this, ranking
of p-values (from smallest to largest) takes place, resulting in
adjusted critical p-values for statistical inference, according to
the formula of I/K × 0.05 (i.e., observed p-value rank/number
of comparisons × level of significance). All comparisons utilized
the 0.05 significance level. This method regulates the false positive
rate, ensuring that no more than 5% of results identified as
significant are in the wrong direction.
Using the Benjamini and Hochberg procedure, total IPO-RT
(reality testing) evidenced small to medium (albeit significant)
correlations with paranormal belief, experience, lucid dreaming,
nightmares, and sleep paralysis. The Auditory and Visual
Hallucinations subfactor of reality testing (compared with
other subfactors) demonstrated the strongest associations with
paranormal belief, experience, lucid dreaming, nightmares,
and sleep paralysis. Of the paranormal measures, paranormal
experience correlated most strongly with these outcomes. This
result was consistent with study expectations and previous
literature (Glicksohn, 1990). Accordingly, subsequent analyses
focused on Auditory and Visual Hallucinations and paranormal
experience. Given small correlations existed between Auditory
and Visual Hallucinations and paranormal experience with lucid
dreaming and nightmares, these variables had relatively low
predictive value in the structural model.
Confirmatory Factor Analyses
Confirmatory factor analysis occurred for each selected scale.
Research indicates that Auditory and Visual Hallucinations
is an intercorrelated but distinct unidimensional subfactor
of IPO-RT (Dagnall et al., 2018). Paranormal experience
also comprised one factor because the variable derived from
experiences that were similar in theme and response scale.
These indexed the most commonly reported attributes of
paranormal experience (receptive psi and life after death) (see
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TABLE 1 | Means, standard deviations and correlations for all study variables (N = 453).
Variable M SD Skew Kurt. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. IPO-RT 40.93 13.37 0.85 0.64 0.89** 0.76** 0.66** 0.92** 0.49** 0.37** 0.19** 0.18** 0.18**
2. AVH 11.96 4.81 0.88 0.28 0.56** 0.52** 0.74** 0.47** 0.41** 0.20** 0.17** 0.18**
3. SD 7.02 2.94 0.97 0.62 0.33** 0.65** 0.22** 0.19** 0.09 0.04 0.16**
4. Confusion 8.51 2.61 0.18 −0.29 0.48** 0.31** 0.09* 0.12* 0.25** 0.07
5. DT 13.42 5.56 0.92 0.55 0.50** 0.38** 0.17** 0.15** 0.17**
6. PB 170.46 53.32 −0.83 −0.50 0.52** 0.04 0.18** 0.09*
7. PExp 1.83 1.87 1.13 0.76 0.11* 0.12* 0.18**
8. LD 56.26 71.44 1.39 1.15 0.25** 0.23**
9. Nightmare 11.81 3.48 −0.09 −0.26 0.24**
10. SP 1.92 1.08 0.70 −0.98
IPO-RT, Inventory of Personality Organization-Reality Testing subscale; AVH, Auditory and Visual Hallucinations; SD, social deficits; DT, delusional thinking; PB, paranormal
belief; PExp, paranormal experience; LD, lucid dreaming; SP, sleep paralysis. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 (also less than the Benjamini and Hochberg adjusted critical p-values).
Drinkwater et al., 2013, 2017b). A two-factor correlated model
examined lucid dreaming and nightmares (dreaming) given
these constructs share semantic similarities (i.e., relate to types
of dreaming). Confirmatory factor analysis excluded item 1 of
lucid dreaming because the purpose of this item was to screen
participants for inclusion in the study.
Prior to confirmatory factor analysis, data screening using
Mardia’s test (Mardia, 1970) for selected study measures
(Auditory and Visual Hallucinations, paranormal experience,
lucid dreaming, and nightmares) indicated multivariate non-
normality. Specifically, for Auditory and Visual Hallucinations
multivariate kurtosis equaled 24.29 (critical ratio = 26.38);
paranormal experience multivariate kurtosis = 41.25 (critical
ratio = 34.71); and Dreaming (i.e., lucid dreaming and
nightmares) multivariate kurtosis = 19.14 (critical ratio = 20.79).
Consequently, subsequent confirmatory factor analyses utilized
bootstrapping (1,000 resamples) to generate accurate bias-
corrected model estimates (at the 95% confidence level). Nevitt
and Hancock (2001) established that naïve bootstrapping is
a sound alternative to other maximum likelihood robust
approaches (e.g., Satorra–Bentler chi-square), and functions well
even in instances of significant non-normality.
The Auditory and Visual Hallucinations unidimensional
model indicated good fit on all indices but RMSEA, which
reported marginal fit, χ2 (8, N = 453) = 44.02, CFI = 0.97,
IFI = 0.97, SRMR = 0.03, RMSEA = 0.10 (CI of 0.07 to 0.13).
All items loaded greater than 0.32. The unidimensional solution
for paranormal experience evidenced good fit on CFI, IFI, and
SRMR, and satisfactory RMSEA, χ2 (19, N = 453) = 60.52,
CFI = 0.94, IFI = 0.94, SRMR = 0.05, RMSEA = 0.07 (CI of 0.05 to
0.09). All items demonstrated factor loadings greater than 0.32,
but item 8 (0.24). The correlated two-factor model for Dreaming
reported good fit overall, χ2 (8, N = 453) = 7.87, CFI = 1.0,
IFI = 1.0, SRMR = 0.02, RMSEA = 0.01 (CI of 0.00 to 0.05). High
factor loadings (above 0.5) existed for all items.
Structural Equation Modeling
Consistent with the study hypotheses, the structural model
tested the notion that Auditory and Visual Hallucinations and
paranormal experience correlated positively and were predictive
of greater levels of lucid dreaming, nightmares, and sleep
paralysis. Prior to model testing, data screening (i.e., Mardia’s
test; Mardia, 1970) indicated multivariate non-normality, as
multivariate kurtosis = 120.03 (critical ratio = 41.09). Similar
to confirmatory factor analyses, structural equation modeling
utilized bootstrapping with 1,000 resamples.
A test of the measurement model (which depicted latent
variables as correlated) suggested good relative fit and satisfactory
absolute fit, χ2 (180, N = 453) = 476.56, CFI = 0.91,
IFI = 0.91, SRMR = 0.06, RMSEA = 0.06 (CI of 0.05 to
0.07). A test of the hypothesized model (Model 1) depicting
predictive relations from Auditory and Visual Hallucinations
and paranormal experience to lucid dreaming, nightmares, and
sleep paralysis indicated good relative and satisfactory absolute
fit, χ2 (181, N = 453) = 451.27, CFI = 0.92, IFI = 0.92,
SRMR = 0.06, RMSEA = 0.06 (CI of 0.05 to 0.06). Computing
a new model (Model 2; Figure 1) and correlating error terms
between paranormal experience items 6 and 7 (‘Precognition’
and ‘Premonition’) resulted in good fit on all indices but SRMR,
which reported satisfactory fit, χ2 (180, N = 453) = 392.59,
CFI = 0.93, IFI = 0.93, SRMR = 0.06, RMSEA = 0.05 (CI of
0.04 to 0.06). Statisticians caution against correlating error terms,
unless appropriate justification exists (Byrne, 2010). In this case,
both items belonged to the same scale and indexed a ‘sensation’
concerning perception of future events. Comparing the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) of Model 1 (593.27) and Model 2
(536.59) revealed that Model 2 offered a superior fit to the data,
given a lower value existed.
Inspection of standardized regression paths revealed that
Auditory and Visual Hallucinations positively predicted lucid
dreaming (β = 0.19, p = 0.003), nightmares (β = 0.16, p = 0.024),
and sleep paralysis (β = 0.15, p = 0.016). Auditory and Visual
Hallucinations also demonstrated a moderate positive correlation
with paranormal experience (0.51, p < 0.001). However,
paranormal experience did not significantly predict either
outcome (lucid dreaming β = 0.02, p = 0.785; nightmares β = -
0.06, p = 0.449; sleep paralysis β = 0.12, p = 0.098). An alternative
model (Model 3) constrained the regression paths from Auditory
and Visual Hallucinations to lucid dreaming outcomes to zero,
thereby examining the influence of paranormal experience whilst
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FIGURE 1 | Model 2 – Hypothesized structural relationships between Auditory and Visual Hallucinations, paranormal experience, lucid dreaming, nightmares, and
sleep paralysis. Ellipses indicate latent variables, squares indicate measured variables, and ‘e’ represents error of measurement. Lines between latent variables
represent standardized coefficients; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
controlling for Auditory and Visual Hallucinations. Although
this model reported weaker fit compared with Model 2 (i.e.,
a higher AIC of 600.27), paranormal experience significantly
predicted lucid dreaming (β = 0.16, p = 0.018) and sleep
paralysis (β = 0.22, p = 0.002), but not nightmares (β = 0.09,
p = 0.160). These findings inferred that Auditory and Visual
Hallucinations was a significant positive predictor of lucid
dreaming and its related facets, whereas paranormal experience
was not. However, paranormal experience was a significant
predictor when marginalizing the influence of Auditory and
Visual Hallucinations. In addition, paranormal experience, and
Auditory and Visual Hallucinations demonstrated a positive
association with one another.
DISCUSSION
Examination of zero-order correlations revealed weak positive
relationships between proneness to reality testing deficits
(IPO-RT) and sleep-related variables (lucid dreaming,
nightmares, and sleep paralysis). Explicitly, higher levels of
self-oriented, subjective information processing style were
associated with greater perceived control within lucid dreams,
Nightmare experience and recall, and incidence of sleep
paralysis. Although as predicted, paranormal measures positively
correlated with proneness to reality testing deficits, relationships
between belief and experience and sleep measures varied as
a function of dissociated state. Specifically, paranormal belief
correlated weakly with sleep paralysis and nightmares. Whereas,
paranormal experience demonstrated similar weak relationships
with lucid dreaming and sleep paralysis.
These outcomes aligned largely with previous research.
Notably, Glicksohn (1990) who reported positive relationships
between paranormal belief and subjective paranormal
experience, and between subjective paranormal experience
and lucid dreaming. Furthermore, Glicksohn (1990) also
observed that paranormal belief was not associated with lucid
dreaming. Differential relationships between lucid dreaming
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and paranormal factors within the current paper support the
notion that ‘experience’ is a better predictor of lucid dreaming
(conscious awareness and control) than belief. In the context of
this article, this makes intuitive and conceptual sense because
experiences focused on perception of productive phenomena
(i.e., receptive psi and life after death; paranormal experience).
Paranormal explanations notwithstanding, from a
psychological perspective experience(s) directly inform
conclusions about the existence of supernatural forces (Irwin
et al., 2013), and indirectly tap into creative, imaginative and
control elements of consciousness. Contrastingly, beliefs do not
require an experiential basis. Accordingly, they are abstract and
less tangible than subjective paranormal experiences.
This supposition is consistent with previous work that found
that reporting of spontaneous paranormal experiences was
associated with openness to and exploration of psychological
space (Holt et al., 2004; Drinkwater et al., 2017a). This is also
congruent with the finding that internal sensitivity predicts
propensity to psi experiences (Honorton, 1972). In turn, these
factors may also explain in part the relationship between
paranormal experience and lucid dreaming.
Examination of the predictive model provided further insights
into the relationships between lucid dreaming, reality testing
and paranormal experience. Although, paranormal experience
correlated moderately with Auditory and Visual Hallucinations,
it did not significantly predict nightmares and sleep paralysis.
Controlling for Auditory and Visual Hallucinations resulted
in significant predictive relationships between lucid dreaming,
nightmares, and sleep paralysis. Given that Auditory and Visual
Hallucinations demonstrated positive significant relationships
with lucid dreaming, nightmares, and sleep paralysis, it is likely
that this explained the majority of the variance when predicting
the sleep-related outcomes.
With regard to dissociated experiences related to REM sleep,
the emergence of Auditory and Visual Hallucinations as the
major factor IPO-RT facet makes conceptual sense. Auditory
and Visual Hallucinations possesses thematic correspondence
with lucid dreaming (i.e., fantasy proneness and creativity) and
links to constructs related to sleep paralysis and nightmares
(i.e., hallucinations and strong visual imagery; Spanos et al.,
1995). Hence, examining IPO-RT subfactors in the current study
provided theoretical insights, which further understanding of
the connection between lucid dreaming control and cognitive-
perceptual individual differences arising from thinking style.
Specifically, that the productive, ‘creative’ elements of reality
testing linked to fantasy proneness explain the construct’s
association with lucid dreaming. Other elements of reality testing
(i.e., social deficits, confusion, and delusional thinking) make
no significant contribution to lucid dreaming control. The
finding that paranormal experience predicted lucid dreaming
in the absence of Auditory and Visual Hallucinations accords
with Glicksohn (1990).
Considering the content of sleep-related measures, lucid
dreaming items were highly associated, whereas nightmare
items demonstrated only weak and moderate relationships. This
pattern of results indicated that aspects of lucid dreaming
(maintaining conscious awareness, dream body control and
design of dream surroundings) were more coherent and closely
aligned than features of nightmares (frequency, distress, and
dream recall). This was compatible with item level content,
which in the case of nightmares sampled a spectrum of construct
content. Sleep paralysis because it indexed frequency, rather than
intensity and/or content, correlated weakly across lucid dreaming
and nightmare items.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future
Research
A potential limitation of the present study was the use of self-
report measures to assess dissociated experiences related to REM
sleep. Although this is a well-established and frequently used
approach, critics have questioned the accuracy of measurement
instruments, particularly the degree to which they provide valid
insights into complex cognitive-perceptual processes. In the
context of sleep, there is evidence that suggests that self-report
measures provide valid snapshots of sleep-related behaviors.
For instance, Biddle et al. (2015) found that self-reports for
habitual sleep duration and onset time were effective compared
to an objective measure (i.e., at least 7 days of actigraphy
monitoring) within large-scale studies. However, they also
found that indifferences, such as those observed in clinically
heterogeneous samples could produce biased estimates. In such
circumstances, the use of objective measures is necessary. Within
the present study, there was no evidence of systematic bias in
sleep behavior. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the self-
report measures provided reasonably valid insights into factors
related to incidence and frequency.
Moreover, there remains concerns about the extent to which
self-report measures provide accurate assessments of reality
testing (Denovan et al., 2017). Reality testing is a complex
cognitive-perceptual factor that involves both knowledge of and
control of cognition (Larkin, 2009; Schneider and Artelt, 2010).
These underlying mechanisms are not easy to assess consciously.
From this perspective, the IPO-RT indexes subjective awareness
of reality testing errors. The reflective, spontaneous evaluation
of reality testing decisions means that judgments may often lack
veracity and/or comprehension.
This a problem that applies to cognitive functions generally.
Accordingly, researchers often report weak relationships between
subjective and objective measures of cognitive performance (Reid
and MacLullich, 2006; Buelow et al., 2014). Noting this, future
studies may wish to assess reality testing via concurrent measures
to ensure that the outcomes reported in this article do not
reflect an artifact of the measure used. Although, it is worth
noting that the IPO-RT has proved psychometrically robust and
is commonly employed by researchers. Generally, the use of self-
report measures facilitate studies such as the present one because
they are expedient, easy to administrate, accessible, possess wide
reach, easy to score, and do not draw upon researcher assessments
(Bell et al., 1985).
Despite the robust methodology of the present study and its
outcomes being consistent with corresponding research, there are
potential limitations that restrict extrapolation of findings. One
foremost concern centres on the use of a cross-sectional design,
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where data collection occurred at one point in time. Critics point
out that it is impossible to establish causality via cross-sectional
designs. This prevents definitive conclusions because outcomes
may result from other unaccounted variables.
In addition to this, observed relationships were small
and require cautious interpretation. This issue is not unique
to the present study, but is a problem inherent within
studies examining relationships between sleep-related factors
and personality generally (see Denis and Poerio, 2017; Aviram
and Soffer-Dudek, 2018). Notwithstanding these concerns,
conclusions were consistent with hypotheses and previous
research. Noting concerns, future work could evaluate the
current findings via a longitudinal study. The inclusion
of multiple time points enables the observation of factors
across time and ensures greater measurement consistency.
This approach is beneficial to theory development because
it will reveal the extent to which sleep-related states are
temporally stable, and provide insights into the degree to which
cognitive-perceptual personality factors, such as Auditory and
Visual Hallucinations and preferential thinking style (subjective,
intuitive, intra-psychic, etc.) interact with sleep-related states
over time. Furthermore, use of longitudinal models enables the
development of causal models.
A further potential limitation within the present study
was the failure to screen for sleep-related conditions and
psychiatric disorders. In the case of sleep-related conditions,
researchers have linked narcolepsy with changes in dream
mentation. Particularly, higher dream recall frequency and
lucid dreaming (Dodet et al., 2015; Rak et al., 2015). Recent
work has also reported an association between narcolepsy
and creativity (Lacaux et al., 2019). Narcolepsy is a chronic
sleep disorder characterized by excessive daytime sleepiness,
disrupted nocturnal sleep, REM sleep occurring at the onset
of sleep, and cataplexy (sudden loss of skeletal muscle tone
in response to strong emotional stimuli) (Singh et al., 2013).
Although narcolepsy is rare (1 in 2,000 people; Scammell,
2015) and therefore unlikely to have a significant effect on
the results of this paper, subsequent research should screen for
potentially conflating sleep-related conditions. In addition to
this, future work could also control for psychiatric disorder.
This is important because conditions such as psychosis can
effect lucid dreaming (Mota et al., 2016; Voss et al., 2018)
and predisposition to fantasy proneness and delusional beliefs
(Tan et al., 2019). Moreover, these variables correlate positively
with belief in the paranormal (Irwin et al., 2012a,b). In the
current paper, these factors were unlikely to have influenced
the reported outcomes because the sample was non-clinical.
Regardless, it is important that future related work controls
for these variables as they potentially influence incidence and
experience of lucid dreaming.
Another possible limitation was the recruitment method used.
The researchers advertised the study via emails to university
staff/students and local stakeholders (businesses, leisure and
vocational/sports classes), and invited only respondents who
had experienced lucid dreams. In terms of sample composition,
this approach has typically produced large data that were
commensurate with equivalent studies (see Dagnall et al., 2014;
Dagnall N. et al., 2016, Dagnall et al., 2019). Furthermore,
there is no reason to believe that these samples are not
reflective of the general population. This is especially true as the
constructs indexed were psychological rather than ability based.
Restricting selection to respondents who had experienced lucid
dreaming was a prerequisite of the study aim, specifically the
intention to examine how experience of lucid dreaming related
to dissociated experiences related to REM sleep, proneness
to reality testing deficits, and paranormal experiences/beliefs.
Although this approach reduced variability with correlations,
it avoided conflation by including participants who had not
experienced lucid dreaming. In the case of the focal variable,
lucid dreaming intensity, this is a major concern since there is
a discrete difference between experiencing (absence vs. presence)
and level (low to high). Combing these elements in analysis has a
distorting effect on intensity by drastically reducing mean values.
Noting these concerns, succeeding research should attempt to
replicate outcomes with different more heterogeneous samples,
and compare experiencers vs. non-experiencers of lucid dreams
on study variables.
Overall, the present study provides a firm foundation for
subsequent work on dissociated experiences related to REM
sleep. This could consider incidence alongside factors such as
control, intensity and content. Research might also usefully
examine cultural and age-related differences.
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